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Associationalist regionalism: from 
‘powers of association’ to ‘associations of 
power’
Bas Hendrikx and Arnoud Lagendijk 
Introduction
Since the 1980s there has been an important shift in thinking about territorial 
governance. This involved both a move away from technical, hierarchical modes 
of government towards more open and participatory forms of decision-making 
(governance), and a rethinking of multi-level governance contexts in general. In 
response to (global) economic, technological, political and intellectual 
challenges, policy-makers in the western world therefore increasingly turned to a 
previously underexposed level of territorial governance: the region. Being 
attuned to the level of daily socio-economic interaction, regions would be better 
able to achieve the twin goals of economic competitiveness and socio-political 
cohesion than the traditional governance frameworks dominated by the central 
state (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Keating, 1998; Keating, 2001; Storper, 1997). 
Within this new current of thought, two general trends of ‘new regionalism’ can 
be distinguished. 
First there are the attempts of national states to scale up their economic and 
political authority through the development of multi-lateral systems of 
cooperation and coordination. Structures such as the EU economic zone, the 
NAFTA and Mercosur are examples of these. The second strand of ‘new 
regionalism’, which is perhaps more dominant in the western world (MacLeod, 
2001), aims at the development of regional governance structures at the sub-
national scale. By decentralising political decision making processes to regional 
agencies, policy makers aim to achieve more flexible structures of governance 
that can design and deliver policies better attuned to local circumstances. 
In this chapter we explore the development of regional governance structures 
of the latter sort. We are particularly interested in the rhetorical and discursive 
grounds that are at the basis of these new regionalist strategies. What claims are 
made and how do such claims affect the actual practices and performances of 
regional governance institutions? Building on the idea that the region has 
become an overloaded concept to which too many (often conflicting) tasks and 
goals are ascribed, we will discuss the limitations of associational approaches. 
Employing a discursive exploration of new regionalist practices and a brief 
empirical analysis of the multi-level governance framework in the Netherlands, 
we will illustrate that tensions between the substantive and political grounds for 
regional governance are severely hampering the performance of regions in multi-
level frameworks. 
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Associationalist regionalism: substantive and political claims for 
regional governance 
Over the last decades, a myriad of extolling theoretical accounts, broad 
observations and political laudations has emerged in favour of regional 
governance. Alongside this, a great number of policy initiatives has been 
launched to try out new forms of regional governance and to learn and circulate 
the ‘lessons’ drawn from policy innovation. Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) 
speak of the development of a ‘regional development industry’ in this context, a 
mushrooming of development agencies, technology transfer centres, consultancy 
companies and research centres focusing on improving the competitive positions 
of regions through new forms of (regional) governance. In line with Thrift’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘cultural circuits of capitalism’ (Thrift, 1999; Thrift, 
2005), Lagendijk and Cornford explore what could perhaps be best labelled as 
the cultural circuits of regionalism - an important discursive apparatus of 
academics, consultants, EU officials and policy makers that engages in the 
circulation of regional governance concepts, discourses and practices across 
Europe. The impact of this discursive apparatus on the field of regional 
governance practices is considerable. Blending theoretical ideas with success 
stories of regional development, these circuits of regionalism bring concepts and 
‘stylised facts’ such as ‘innovative milieus’, ‘clusters’ and ‘learning regions’ into 
the field. Through ‘endless presentations and representations in seminars, 
conferences and publications’, together with many practical applications and try-
outs, such concepts and discourses have circulated widely and have influenced 
the working and setting up of a wide array of regional governance practices 
across Europe (Lagendijk, 2005; Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). Generally 
speaking, regional governance is favoured on two grounds. First, there is the 
substantive case for regional governance where the region is described as the 
most apt level of governance to address spatial-environmental problems in a 
common governance framework. Second, there are the political claims 
(organisational-administrative) for regional governance, providing a means to 
facilitate a shift from government to governance. Both strands will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
The substantive case for regional governance 
The region plays an important role in discussions about the ways to approach 
substantive policy problems and goals. It features here as a more flexible scale of 
governance that is better able to confront problems arising from external trends, 
such as globalisation and growing global economic competition, and is believed 
to be a more appropriate site for policy coordination and collaboration. A wide 
variety of arguments and narratives on the substantive tasks and roles of regional 
governance circulates through policy making circuits and many of them are 
influencing regional governance practices across the world.  Sorting the core 
claims from strong to more modest, the following summary emerges: 
Political: Regions are endowed with political significance in scalar accounts 
on political power and competencies and accounts of ‘destatisation’ (Jessop, 
2004). In such accounts, economic globalisation and the enhanced mobility of 
capital produce selective processes of (induced) ‘hollowing out’ and (intentional) 
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devolution. The result is a shift in power from the national towards the sub-
national level, as well as to other governance arenas such as the market and 
associational structures. In a positive sense, regions feature here because, they 
are pictured as the nexuses of interdependencies between state and non-state 
bodies that come up with novel, potentially radical, solutions and models 
sustaining regional performance (cf. Storper). In a more negative sense, regions 
are considered suitable places to carry the brunt of globalisation in terms of 
coping with rising social inequality and deprivation, ecological problems and the 
urgency of providing and maintaining a well-oiled, and hence competitive, 
infrastructure (e.g. high-profile business estates, luxury housing and amenities, 
modern consumption spaces, congestion-free transit and global connections) 
Economic: Close in line with the political story, regions are presented as 
economic powerhouses, partially or largely substituting for the significance of 
national economies, due to a shifting basis of economic competitiveness. As the 
story goes, in the past, macro stability, basic infrastructures (e.g. education) and 
major state projects (and ‘national champions’) were key; now it is the relational 
synergy between spatially concentrated and embedded networks of businesses 
and knowledge organisations that is seen as the key to wealth (Keating 2001). 
The latter is fostered, moreover, by the specialisation of the local labour market 
and the educational sector that, together with economic specialisation, supports 
the development of particular regional clusters. 
Policy-making: The latter role also draws on a notion of the region as an 
‘integral’ site of policy making and customisation. A crucial shortcoming of 
what is considered as the old-style, technocratic and centralised policy making is 
sectoral and territorial fragmentation. Together with other spatial levels, notably 
the neighbourhood and the municipality, the region is thus considered as a 
suitable site for developing area-based policies, that, through integrating multiple 
sectorally defined fields of policy in an encompassing spatial framework can 
deliver more effectively in a way more in tune with local needs and conditions 
(Herrschel and Newman, 2002). 
Territorial collaboration: Yet, picturing the region as a site of policy 
integration is not only a response to the alleged shortcomings of fragmentation 
between top-down sectoral policies. It is also seen as a solution for another form 
of territorial fragmentation, namely that between adjacent municipalities. In the 
most basic form, regionalisation can stem from the need for (or simply the 
benefits arising from) the co-ordination of services such as health, police, 
education et cetera. Another problem is that of inter-municipal rivalry, which, 
especially in larger city-regional areas, often presents serious bottlenecks for 
addressing local problems and shaping strategic policies. To address these 
problems, the municipalities involved, often assisted by the central state, embark 
on processes of shaping regional forms of governance that, in a negotiated style, 
produce shared views and common solutions. 
The political case for regional governance 
Regional governance also features as a response to debates on political decision-
making and representation. Recent moves from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, 
and, in this wake, from technical to participatory forms of policy-making, can be 
seen as manifestations of a dominant transformation in political and policy 
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processes. Was the past, in broad terms, characterised by top-down, technocratic 
and sequential modes of decision making and policy implementation, over the 
last decades we have witnessed the rise of more inclusive and recursive models 
that aim at balancing bottom-up initiative and responsibility and top down 
facilitation, monitoring, and the provision of knowledge exchange (Bruszt, 
2005). Subsequently, it is a small step from such a move towards inclusiveness 
and participation towards the interest in the sub-national level as a key arena of 
policy-making and even political initiative. Healey’s work on collaborative 
planning, for instance, portrays the region as a core level to forge inclusive 
networks to promote broad engagement and the infusion of new ideas. After a 
period of strong top-down national control, the growth in co-operation between 
regional authorities, professional organisations and civil society groups is seen as 
an expression of a move towards bottom-up, participative forms governance and 
hence from technocracy to democracy (Herrschel and Newman, 2002). 
Regions, according to Keating (1998), should thus be interpreted as nexuses of 
interchanges, involving government and civil society. Regions function as 
meeting places and systems of action, but they also present the basis for the 
shaping of identity and political mobilisation. As ‘social constructs of a relational 
nature’ (Gualini, 2001:7), they are “a meeting place and an arena for 
negotiation of functional and territorial systems of action, in economics, society 
and politics” (Keating, 1998:184). Through such dynamics they acquire a more 
stable and recognised institutional shape. The consequence is that regions 
increasingly have to compete with national and other levels of government not 
only for resources but also: “in the provision of solution of policy problems”
(Keating, 1998:185). 
The latter conclusion bears directly on a second issue, that of legitimacy. In 
addition to policy change in a substantive sense, regions in a multi-level 
governance setting are to provide a response to what is conceived as a major 
governance gap, namely that between systems of representation and actual 
processes of decision making (Heinze and Schmid, 1994; Herrschel and 
Newman, 2002; Keating, 1998). Regions are thought to close this gap by 
building two bridges, namely between different state levels and between state 
and non-state actors. The EU, in particular, has embraced regional governance as 
part of a wider set of multi-level governance strategies to promote the 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability of its actions. From this perspective, 
participatory approaches at the regional level can serve to enhance the legitimacy 
of policy actions that have a national or international scope. Especially 
interesting in this respect are the way the ‘bottom-up’ cross-border initiatives of 
the EU are part of the European project of territorial integration and cohesion. 
At the national level, issues of legitimacy often stem from problems local and 
national authorities face when trying to develop and implement major 
infrastructural projects. It is no coincidence that regional governance structures 
often stem from the need to find support, both amongst state and non-state 
actors, for major transport investments and business estates (Jensen and 
Richardson, 2004; Vigar et al., 2000) Regions as part of a wider multi-level 
governance framework then serve to find an appropriate structure for wheeling 
and dealing between the various agents and scales, in such a way that sufficient 
levels of resources and commitment can be mobilised to carry on particular 
projects. However, as many cases show (e.g. Horan and Jonas, 1998), such 
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models do not always manage to stem the problems of political fragmentation 
and territorial conflicts. On the contrary, the search for administrative fixes 
always turns out to be illusive. While new forms of governance are able to 
address certain issues more efficiently and effectively, they also create new 
tensions and conflicts. In other words, whatever the ‘logic’ followed, governance 
remains deeply political. There are no simple administrative fixes for complex 
social, economic and spatial problems. 
Irritatingly Full? 
One can take the discussion one step further. As shown above, various 
‘functional’ logics serve to ascribe regions with many virtues. However, regions 
are not outcomes of these logics; they result from political projects and ambitions 
that employ these logics, although they generally fail to endow regions with clear 
cut objectives and mandates. The leading imaginary of the region is one of a 
synergetic powerhouse that is economically, socially, environmentally, 
politically, democratically and spatially rewarding. But taking it all together, the 
region appears as over-determined and ‘irritatingly full’ (Miggelbrink, 2002). In 
reality the narratives, notably in the action they imply, are fraught with tensions 
and ambiguities. As an example, the political account of regions against 
globalisation inspired Amin and Thrift (1995) to call for nurturing “powers of 
association” that present “an attempt to set up networks of small firms and 
intermediate institutions that can act as a counter to the power of the networks of 
large corporations and dominant institutions”. The more policy-oriented 
perspectives, on the other hand, present an image of horizontal and vertical 
collaboration, based on a more consensual notion of the overall (economic, 
social, environmental) aims of regional development. Where they see 
oppositions to address, it is more in the area of administrative competencies and 
‘petty’ rivalry between adjacent territories and scales than in the struggle against 
the ‘forces of capitalism’. 
Partly in response to these tensions, state actors and policy-makers have turned 
to approaches that present the local/regional as a kind of learning ‘laboratory’ for 
developing joined-up solutions, within a broader (inter)national setting 
producing overall aims and conditions, facilitation, monitoring and learning (cf. 
Gualini, 2004). This translates into a policy learning ecology that, through cycles 
of variation and selection, may overcome the problem of mono-cropping that 
characterises many fields of policy-making. According to critical voices, for 
instance, the field of regional development policy is replete with ‘boilerplate 
approaches’ that even frequently succeed in repeating previously failed 
approaches (Storper and Scott, 1995). Such configurations can be found in 
national policy programmes in which the development and implementation of 
area-based policies is guided by interregional or national ‘centres/networks of 
expertise’.  
An interesting question is now to what extent such an ‘irritatingly full’ region 
can meet the promise of moving from ‘old’ top-down, technocratic and 
sequential modes of decision making and policy implementation. On the one 
hand, these configurations can be labelled as ‘non hierarchical’ in the sense that 
they have generally more scope for offering bottom-up and novel perspectives 
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with the potential of uprooting mainstream notions and practices of policy-
making, at least at the local/regional level. In the words of Bruszt (2005:4), 
regions are thus presented “as sites of institutional experimentation to counter 
deficiencies of the defunct hierarchical steering of development and correct 
market failures.” On the other hand, the central level (national or international) 
continues to set the broader conditions of local action and, most significantly, the 
lessons and consequences drawn from that. In the end, state action will always be 
strategically selective in what is facilitated and what is reproduced (Jessop). This 
raises, once more, the issue of legitimacy and democratic support. Are regions 
indeed sites of governance that acquire legitimacy and power through 
associationalist practices? Or is it the way certain associative discourses are 
employed, through the powers-that-be, that counts? 
Responding, in particular, to the policy challenges arising in the late 1980s and 
1990s, the so-called ‘New Regionalist’ literature shifted from a critical political-
economy perspective to a ‘softer’ institutionalist approach (MacLeod, 2001). 
Building, in a relational manner, ‘institutional capacity’, regions could nourish 
‘associational modes of economic organisation’ that would sustain, in turn, a 
region’s competitive and innovative capacity (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Storper 
(1997), in his elaboration of the notion of a ‘Regional World’ that acts and 
interacts on the basis of locally embedded ‘conventions’, emphasises the crucial 
role of talk between regional agents to shape regional political and economic 
strength. Yet, such attempts to move to more constructive and developmental 
perspectives on the region have not really managed to address the issue of 
fullness. Also the broader literature appears to be lacking in this respect. Rather 
than critically examining, conceptually and empirically, how the different stories 
fit together in concrete cases of region formation, the literature tends to focus on 
advocating overarching concepts that, in different configurations, selectively 
draw on the regionalist narratives. For instance, planning oriented accounts tend 
to take the economic and political accounts as ‘received wisdom’, employing 
these to inform and support conceptualisation of strategic regional governance 
(Healey et al., 1997). Economically oriented accounts, on the other hand, often 
invoke relatively simple notions of spatial governance to elaborate notions of 
spatially embedded ‘collective learning’ and systematic innovation. Detailed 
empirical work, furthermore, is often lacking in theoretical reflection, often 
rather simply presenting a case as an endorsement of the wonders of 
associational practices. Below, we will assess these issues by exploring 
associationalist regionalism in the Netherlands, first in a broader historical 
context, and then focusing on more specific recent developments. 
Associationalist regionalism in practice: the case of regional 
governance in the Netherlands 
Since the early 1800s the Dutch governance system has been dominated by the 
central state. The lower level authorities (the provinces, water boards and 
municipalities) are endowed with competences devolved to them by the central 
state. At first sight, the provinces are the closest thing to a regional government 
in the Netherlands, but their role in the Dutch multi-level governance system 
remains limited (Hulst, 2005). Moreover, the province mainly acts as an 
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intermediary agent between the central state and local government and has little 
power on itself (Vries, 2008; Peters, 2007). Until recently (the early 1990s) no 
other powerful body of regional governance existed in the Netherlands. 
Although some developments go back to the early 1900s, claims for regional 
governance have really become more pressing in Dutch policy-making circuits 
from the 1970s onwards. It was believed that a system of regional governance 
would provide better and more flexible means for integral-strategic intervention, 
regional cooperation and territorial governance than the traditional state-
province-municipality framework (ROB, 2003; Hulst, 2005). A specific claim 
put forward drew on policy discourses on territorial collaboration (see Hulst, 
2005). Because of the weak mandate of the Dutch provinces, cooperation and 
coordination between municipalities to address problems and issues of supra-
local scale proved to be extremely difficult. The main reason was that the 
provinces simply lacked the power or the interest to overrule individual 
municipalities. As a result, municipalities often let their individual interests 
prevail over the regional interest, often leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ between 
municipalities. So, instead of bolstering benefits from regional cooperation, the 
competition between individual municipalities actually hampered regional 
development on the whole (see for instance Gualini, 2007:304; VNG and 
Pröpper, 2008). 
However, these pressures did not directly lead to institutional change. There 
would be no significant changes in the Dutch governance framework until the 
mid-1980s (Hulst, 2005). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many municipalities 
therefore decided to build upon the existing institutional infrastructure to develop 
ways to cooperate regionally. The most important legal context was provided by 
the Joint Provisions Act (WGR) of the early 1950s, which was enacted to 
stimulate and regulate territorial collaboration amongst municipalities. Inspired 
by discourses on territorial collaboration -that stressed the importance of 
achieving higher levels of efficiency through functional cooperation- 
municipalities set up a wide variety of regional, single-purpose agencies aimed at 
coordinating and integrating different public services regionally. This often 
involved functional cooperation between municipalities in the field of collective 
waste disposal, fire fighting, disaster contingency plans, ambulance services et 
cetera.
The concept proved to be popular and in the mid-1980s a heterogeneous and 
scattered patchwork of over 1500 regional, single purpose agencies existed in the 
Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005). At one moment there were even more 
regional collaborative arrangements than municipalities in the Netherlands! This 
created problems in terms of policy-coordination and transparency. Different 
single purpose agencies in the same area had different definitions of the region 
and its boundaries, and the wide variety of different agencies active in the same 
area created an almost chaotic institutional environment. This heavily 
complicated the synchronisation and coordination of regional policy, leading to 
many conflicts, tensions and inefficiencies (Geelhoed, 2002). These problems 
demanded a more integral and coordinated approach to regional cooperation. 
In the mid-1980s therefore, the national government revised the Joint 
Provision act of the 1950s (WGR+), now forcing municipalities to integrate the 
different single purpose agencies into one larger multi-purpose regional 
governance body. The latter would also have a democratic body consisting of 
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members of the elected councils of the participating municipalities. Under the 
new scheme, the regional agencies delivered some satisfactory results with 
respect to cooperation on public services. However, as the basic premise of 
regional cooperation remained one of voluntary participation and cooperation, 
not much happened in the field of economic development (Andeweg and Irwin, 
2005). Municipalities in the Netherlands were rather reluctant to give up their 
autonomy on economic matters and they were certainly not willing to transfer 
these competences to regional agencies (Nota kaderwet, 1994). 
The need for regional cooperation and coordination in the field of economic 
development was expressed more urgently in the early 1990s. Under the 
(alleged) pressure of growing economic competition, especially with other 
European (urban) regions, the Dutch national government initiated a project 
which was directly concerned with regional economic development, aimed in 
particular at the main urban regions in the Netherlands (Geelhoed, 2002). The 
city regions of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven/Helmond, 
Arnhem/Nijmegen and Enschede/Hengelo were the main targets of this new 
policy. The temporary framework act ‘Kaderwet Bestuur in Verandering’ (the 
Act Administrative Change 1994) obliged municipalities that partook in a 
regional governance framework to transfer several of their competences (in 
particular on the field of economic development) to the regional agency. The act 
provided a firmer institutional basis for regional governance, endowing regional 
agencies with more competences, in particular, in the field of spatial planning 
(notably infrastructure) and economic development. The main competences 
ascribed to regional governance agencies involved (obligatory) collaboration in 
the fields of spatial planning, housing, transport and infrastructure, economic 
affairs and environmental issues. Yet, because the ‘obligatory collaboration’ in 
regional governance agencies was still based upon consensual politics, 
municipalities still pulled the key levers (Hulst, 2005; Geelhoed, 2002:39). As a 
result, regional governance agencies remained rather indecisive and powerless. 
Regional governance in practice: problems and discrepancies, the case of 
Arnhem-Nijmegen. 
As Hulst remarks, in theory, the new context constituted regional agencies with 
sufficient power to coordinate local governments and create coherent regional 
policies. In practice, however, these agencies did not fulfil the series of tasks that 
were the very reason of their existence (Hulst, 2005). First of all, there were 
many discrepancies between policy competences and decision making 
procedures of regional governance agencies. This relates, in particular, to the 
conflicts between the democratic/ representative structure of the regional 
governance agencies (based upon the polder model/ consensus) and the need to 
go beyond the interests of individual municipalities in favour of regional interest. 
The design of the democratic structure and the processes of decision making 
within these governance bodies has severely hampered their output. As the 
management of the regional agencies mainly lies in the hands of indirectly 
elected representatives from the participating municipal councils, municipalities 
are still pulling the most important levers. This has led to major legitimacy and 
accountability gaps and a vast indecisiveness of these regional agencies which 
made them unable to address the urgent matter of regional policy integration and 
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the development of coherent and strong regional economies. Instead of 
generating a powerful proactive regional authority with sufficient capacities to 
deal with major economic, political and societal changes (Gualini, 2001), 
decision-making within the regional governance agencies was severely bound by 
the self-interest of municipalities (Geelhoed, 2002:42). This has hugely negative 
effects on the overall sharpness and decisiveness of regional governance 
agencies. 
Another set of problems comes out of the tensions between the different 
substantive goals for regional governance. Most important to mention here are 
the conflicts arising from tensions between political-economic claims for 
regionalism and the policy-making/collaboration discourses. Such problems are 
mainly caused by the different economic interests of the municipalities involved 
in regional governance. Whereas most regional governance areas in the 
Netherlands are dominated by one or more core cities, they also consist of 
several smaller, often more sub-urban or even rural municipalities. As major 
cities tend to have different (economic) interests than rural and sub-urban 
municipalities, there is often more competition over regional economic 
development policies than one that can actually speak of real territorial 
‘collaboration’. Rather, instead of pursuing regional policy coordination and 
cooperation, struggles over economic policy (notably competition in providing 
business parks and attracting firms) are actually producing territorial 
fragmentation. Such tensions are also intensified by the different hierarchical 
positions that municipalities take up in regional governance agencies. As Dutch 
regionalist policy is first and foremost targeted at city regions, it is often the core 
cities that have the dominant voice in regional governance agencies, at the 
expense of sub-urban and rural municipalities. This often leads to conflicts (see 
the discussion in Geelhoed, 2002). 
An illustrative example of this is the case of the city-region Arnhem-
Nijmegen. Via the regional governance agency (the KAN) the core cities 
Arnhem and Nijmegen aimed to set up a multi-mode transport centre in the rural 
area of the municipality of Elst (which is located just between the two core 
cities). For both Nijmegen and Arnhem, the setting up of this transport centre 
was a matter of economic urgency. Through its development, the cities tried to 
hook on to an international trade-route from Rotterdam to Germany and Eastern-
Europe. The municipality of Elst and some smaller rural/sub-urban 
municipalities in the region agreed to the importance of such a development but 
also feared the impact it would have on the local environment and infrastructure. 
In other words, they supported the idea but operated on a ‘not in my backyard 
strategy’. Despite this opposition, the cities of Arnhem and Nijmegen pushed on 
with the planning of the development of the transport centre using their power 
over the regional governance agency (in which they had the most powerful 
votes). However, they did not succeed. The municipality of Elst, together with 
some of the smaller municipalities in the region, resisted the development of a 
transport centre in their proximity by linking up to citizens groups, 
environmental NGOs and activists. This created widespread public opposition to 
the plans. When they finally appealed against the project in the higher court, the 
court ruled against the project (on the basis of environmental law) and the 
development came to a complete stop. This also led to political fragmentation in 
the city-region’s governance agency. At present, the regional agency continues to 
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coordinate, in particular, regional housing and transport planning. It is also 
investing more in region-marketing. The region now sells itself under the label of 
‘cool region’, see http://www.coolregion.nl). This presents, to some extent, a 
move away from primarily economically oriented discourses and towards issues 
that may appeal more to local citizens, like housing, education and leisure. The 
future will tell what this will mean for the position of the regional agency in 
terms of legitimacy and capacity to act. 
Conclusion
Regional governance has emerged as an increasingly popular concept. It has 
been represented as a synergetic and coherent mode of governance that embraces 
a variety of policy discourses of both substantive and political character, notably 
through its capacity to enrol a variety of resources and to harness public support. 
Cherished even by the traditional territorial ‘powers’, notably the central state 
and the municipal administrations, the region features as a cure-for-all, meeting a 
broad set of policy challenges. 
However, as the case of associationalist regionalism in the Netherlands shows, 
in real life, regions seem to be severely hampered by way they are loaded with 
tasks and goals. Behind its powerful and appealing image, regional governance 
has become replete with contradictions, ambiguities and tensions. In particular, 
in contrast to its function as a lubricator and catalyst, the comprehensive and 
associative character of regional governance often appears to be a major 
stumbling block. To achieve their goals, regional agencies therefore often resort 
to the strategic use of the powers-that-be without much attention to the broader 
governance context in which they operate. 
The question then arises as to whether regions could still become the highly 
potential ‘associations of power’ as initially represented. Are regions actually 
able to fulfil the wide array of tasks and goals set out for them, in an open and 
democratic way, as expected? In the current state of affairs, we are inclined to 
answer this question negatively. The region has become an intrinsically 
ambivalent concept and many (internal) conflicts arise from tensions between the 
multiplicity of tasks and discourses it has been associated with. Not only are 
there many conflicts between the many substantive claims for regionalism and 
accounts of political legitimisation, the specific governance settings in which 
regions operate make it far from easy to adopt democratic and associate 
practices. What we thus see is that the myriad of appealing narratives on 
regionalism, the various consultancy practices which spawn out of it and the 
legion of examples, texts, lectures and presentations that circulate have perhaps 
been too enthusiastically establishing the region as a governance panacea. 
What is required, accordingly, is a greater sensitivity in both academic work 
on and policy experiments with regionalism. Rather than overloading regional 
governance practices with ‘stylised facts’, appealing concepts and promises, 
there is a need to approach things more reflexively. In order to create regions that 
have sufficient political standing, policy makers and academics should better 
consider how ideas and theories about regional governance will actually work 
out in the field. This asks for a closer relationship between discursive knowledge 
and governance practice. Only through such reflexive practices will regions be 
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able to meet the promise of ‘power of association’ beyond a mere performance 
of ‘associations of power-that-be’. 
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